1MDB-Tanore trial: The explosive witness statement of Najib's former aide

TheEdge Sat, Sep 07, 2019 01:30am - 4 years View Original


(Sept 6): Secret meetings with Jho Low, discreet mission to China to secure 1MDB's bail out, and what went on behind the scene when the embezzlement at 1MDB was exposed — these are but some of the explosive details revealed by the 8th witness in the 1MDB-Tanore Trial, Datuk Amhari Efendi Nazaruddin. He is former special officer to ex-Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak, who is in the dock.

Below is Amhari's witness statement, translated and reproduced in full:

Written statement

Name: Datuk Amhari Efendi Bin Nazaruddin
Position: Former special officer to the Prime Minister of Malaysia
IC: 760716-10-5011
Age: 43 years

1. I'm from Petaling Jaya. My highest education is a bachelor's degree in Economics from the University of Warwick, United Kingdom, from which I graduated in 1999. I received a full scholarship from Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). Upon graduation in 1999, I began my career at the BNM office in Kuala Lumpur as a senior executive responsible for economic reporting to the Department of Economics.

2. In 2006, I was seconded from BNM to the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), the Prime Minister’s Department (JPM), as a Special Officer to the Minister. At the time, the Minister at EPU was Datuk Seri Mohd Effendi Norwawi. My duties were assisting programmes of the YB Minister that involved economics-based programmes as well as attend selected meetings involving the Minister. This secondment lasted until early 2008.

3. After that, I returned to work at BNM as a manager in the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC). After about two months on the job, I was contacted by Datuk Wan Shihab, who was a Special Officer to the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) at the time, Datuk Seri Mohd Najib Bin Abd Razak (DS Najib), who asked me to attend an interview for the position of Special Officer to the DPM.

4. The interview was conducted at DS Najib's residence on Jalan Langgak Duta. DS Najib himself interviewed me. About a week later, I was contacted by Datuk Wan Shihab informing me that my interview for the position of Special Officer to the DPM had been successful and that the appointment would be in the nature of a loan from BNM.

5. As Special Officer to the DPM, my tasks at that time included managing the 1Malaysia.com.my blog, managing social media or any online communications for the DPM, as well as some works related to the economy such as the preparation of his speeches that involved economic-related data.
 
6. Because the idea for the 1Malaysia branding that was brought about by DS Najib was new at the time and needed to be promoted, my team and I were responsible for promoting the 1Malaysia branding through social media such as Twitter and blogs. Furthermore, at that time, DS Najib was expected to take the office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia.

7. When I was working at the DPM Office, I was placed under the supervision of the late Datuk Azlin Alias (Datuk Azlin). In April 2009, after DS Najib was elected as the 6th Prime Minister (PM), my position was immediately changed to Special Officer to the Prime Minister. I was then placed in the Economics Division under the supervision of Datuk Azlin who was the Director of the Economics Division, Prime Minister's Office (PMO).

8. As the Special Officer to the PM in the Economics Division, my duties were:

    a. Coordinate the PM’s programmes that involved economic matters with the relevant agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Trade and International Industry, Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives, and Consumerism, the Ministry of Women and Family Development, government-linked companies (GLCs) including 1Malaysia Development Bhd, the Securities Commission, Bank Negara Malaysia and others;

    b. Prepare the PM’s speeches that were related to economic matters

    c. Assist in obtaining economic data from any relevant parties for the preparation of the PM's speech for any of his programmes
 
    d. Coordinate data from any of the related Ministries or agencies in the event that there are proposals from the PM to review Government policies, for example, increasing the amount for Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (BR1M);

    e. Draft and plan the PM's Budget speech with help from all Ministries

    f. Undertake whatever instructions from my superior officer, who was Datuk Azlin, from time to time, and

    g. Undertake tasks based on the instructions received, whether directly or indirectly, from the PM from time to time, whereby those tasks were outside the work scope stated above.

9. In January 2010, a company was formed by the name of ORB Solutions Sdn Bhd, in which Noorhaina Hirawani Binti Mohd Noor and I were the joint directors. The company was established to promote the 1Malaysia brand. It also acted as an entity to manage matters related to the 1Malaysia.com.my blog and the PM's social media activities. Besides that, the company would also do coverage of the events attended by the PM for material to be used in the 1Malaysia.com.my blog, as well as the PM's social media accounts on Twitter and Facebook. I was appointed as one of the joint directors to facilitate and validate that the work done by this company was for DS Najib. I was a director of this company until 2014.

10. In March 2014, Datuk Azlin was promoted to Chief Private Secretary (KSUS) to the PM. Consequently, there was a vacant position in the Director of PMO’s Economics Division. So around mid-2014, I was promoted to be the Director of the PMO’s Economics Division-cum-PM’s Special Officer.

11. I don't hold any positions in nor have I registered as a member of, any political party. I have no direct involvement in politics. However, my political involvement was indirect, which was through instructions from DS Najib or the PMO. Among these instructions were the preparation of his speeches and election preparations. I also attended the Umno's annual generla assembly in my capacity as special officer to the PM.

DATO SRI NAJIB BIN TUN ABD RAZAK

12. The first time I met DS Najib was when I was interviewed by him for the post of Special Officer to the DPM in mid-2008. During my 10 years of service for him, I found that DS Najib was a leader who was a gentleman, able to carry out whatever he planned, charismatic and and cleverly eloquent at expressing his wishes.
 
13. DS Najib's way of working was so strategic and he is good at dividing up tasks that were special/confidential/ highly classified. He is also good at organizing the roles of his senior officers in obtaining their ideas or opinions. Each officer will only know what is relevant to their roles. They will never get the complete picture of the ultimate purpose of a major mission or task that was assigned to them.

14. This practice was used by DS Najib for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality and to enable his officers to provide different views so that DS Najib always has the full advantage and insight in any matter. Most of the meetings to discuss confidential matters were done in DS Najib's own home on Jalan Langgak Duta and only close and trusted individuals would be called for discussions.

15. As a Special Officer, I was required to understand and familiarise myself with Najib's way of working. I have also been advised by more senior officers, who had served Najib long before I did, to never reveal the instructions I received from DS Najib to anyone unless I was directed to do so by DS Najib himself.

16. DS Najib had an advisor who was important to him, an individual named Low Taek Jho, also known as Jho Low. Jho Low knew Najib even before I started working with him. To my knowledge, DS Najib's family, including Datin Seri Rosmah Mansur, were also very close to Jho Low as I had noticed that Jho Low frequently received calls from Datin Seri Rosmah but I never knew the details of their conversations.

17. During my time of service with DS Najib, he regularly met with Jho Low to discuss a number of matters, including confidential matters. Occasionally, special instructions involving confidential matters that were given to me or Datuk Azlin came from Jho Low and I am sure those instructions were mostly conveyed or known and agreed to by DS Najib himself. I say that because most of the time Datuk Azlin or I reviewed the instructions we received from Jho Low with Najib, and we found that he was aware of the instructions and most of the time he agreed with them and directed us to do it.

LOW TAEK JHO (JHO LOW)

18. In reference to my acquaintance with Jho Low, our first meeting took place in 2007, which was before I was even appointed as Special Officer to DS Najib. I first came to know Jho Low, who I call Jho, when I was the Special Officer to the EPU Minister Datuk Seri Mohd Effendi Norwawi.

19. At that time, Datuk Seri Mohd Effendi Norwawi had a Communications Officer named Dennis See. In one of Datuk Seri Mohd Effendi's work trips to Penang, Dennis See and I joined him. After the programme/meeting was done, Dennis See invited me to meet someone whom he said was really close to Najib, who was then the DPM and the Minister of Defence. Dennis See also told me that Jho is very close to DS Najib's family.

20. We met at a restaurant located in downtown Georgetown. While we were at the restaurant, a Chinese man dressed in batik came and Dennis See introduced me to the man known as Jho Low. He asked me to call him Jho. During the meeting, I found that the way Jho was telling me about DS Najib's family was as if he was in the inner-circle of DS Najib and Datin Seri Rosmah's family. The meeting lasted for about half an hour and then Dennis and I returned to our hotel. At that time, I exchanged phone numbers with Jho. Our second meeting happened when I was eating at TGI Friday in Live Centre, Jalan Sultan Ismail, in early 2008. Coincidentally, Jho was eating at the same restaurant and he only raised his hand when he noticed I was there.

21. On the first day I reported for work as as the DPM’s Special Officer in September 2008, Jho contacted me via a text message that said something like, “Bro, I heard you are in DPM Office, congratulations and we will be closely in touch”. To my understanding, he meant that we would meet and be in touch regularly since Jho himself was close to my boss, DS Najib. I'm sure Jho found out that I started working at the DPM’s Office either from DS Najib himself or Datin Seri Rosmah because Jho was really close to and often met with the two of them.

22. After dealing with Jho a few times, he informed me himself that he was close to DS Najib's family. Jho told me many times that he regularly met with DS Najib's family and that at times he knew more of the plans that had been set up by DS Najib's family, which were sometimes even beyond my own knowledge as DS Najib's Special Officer. I was told by Jho that he has been close to DS Najib's family since he knew DS Najib's step-son Riza Shahriz Bin Abdul Aziz in their teens. Riza then introduced Jho to Datin Seri Rosmah. He also told me that Rosmah had no qualms for Jho to be close to their family.

23. Although Jho was still a young man, I saw that he has incredible charisma and extraordinary powers. Jho would direct those of us from the Prime Minister's Office, especially Datuk Azlin and I, in carrying out Najib's instructions. Besides that, Jho also knew other individuals in the PMO who would take action based on his orders and most of these instructions would be implemented. This situation could be seen for example in meetings that were conducted, where there were discussions about directions and implementation actions for each directive given by Jho and these were raised by those individuals. This was because he was the unofficial adviser (without official appointment/classified) to Najib on special behind-the-scenes duties that were not known by outsiders, covering many things including international programmes, work visits, business and policy proposals, charity works, as well as 1MDB.

24. Jho was also the strategist in investment matters, negotiations between Government and Government or "G to G", as well as DS Najib's political strategist, including for the funds raised by DS Najib.

25. Every directive given by Jho must also be carried out because I believe he had obtained prior approval from DS Najib. I never questioned any of these instructions. But there were times and if necessary, Datuk Azlin or myself had checked the instructions with DS Najib for confirmation. Most of the time, I was informed by DS Najib that Jho's instructions were approved by him. Datuk Azlin also informed me that, after he checked, Jho's orders were always endorsed by Najib and we were asked to take follow-up actions.

DATUK AZLIN ALIAS (KSUS YAB PM)

26. I started working closely with Datuk Azlin since I started working as a Special Officer to the DPM. At that time, DS Najib had placed me in the Economics Division and my supervisor was Datuk Azlin. After Najib took office as Prime Minister, Datuk Azlin continued to lead the Economics Division as the Director of the PMO’s Economics Division until he was promoted to become the Prime Minister's Chief Private Secretary (KSUS PM) on March 6, 2014.

27. Subsequently, I was appointed as the Director of the PMO Economics Division in mid-2014. On April 4, 2015, Datuk Azlin was killed in an accident when a helicopter that was supposed to carry him from Pekan, Pahang to Kuala Lumpur, crashed in Semenyih, Kajang.

28. For as long as I knew him, Datuk Azlin was loyal to his superior DS Najib, very kind, efficient, and quick in understanding the subject matter of a discussion. He was also usually calm at work and was well-liked by many in the way he managed his work. He was also a person who knew how to keep the confidentiality of anything he discussed with Najib. Therefore, Najib placed his full trust in him because of his secretive nature and his obedience to instructions.

29. Throughout the time I worked with Datuk Azlin, I knew that he knew a lot about DS Najib's confidential discussions with Jho, including matters pertaining to 1MDB, funds that were used for 1MDB, political strategies arranged for DS Najib, and any confidential matters related to DS Najib.

30. As for the close relationship between Jho and DS Najib, Jho was in direct contact with Najib and this was a known, clear fact to many who were close to Najib and Jho. Jho knew me before he knew Datuk Azlin. Therefore, he used me to get to know Datuk Azlin better. The first meeting between the two of them was arranged by me at the request of Jho in 2009 in a hotel room, but I do not remember the name of the hotel.

DS NAJIB/JHO LOW'S MODUS OPERANDI

31. Concerning the directives and confidential meetings among the three of us, that is Jho, Datuk Azlin and I, Jho would firstly contact me via text, asking me to arrange a meeting with Datuk Azlin.

I would then refer this matter to Datuk Azlin to coordinate a suitable timing. We usually met at night at Prince Hotel Kuala Lumpur. Often on the night of our meeting, Jho would first go to DS Najib's house on Jalan Langgak Duta to discuss and obtain confirmation of the documents to be discussed with us. This we knew because Jho told us himself.

32. Often, Jho will first email the documents that will be discussed before the meeting. But every time, Jho will bring with him the necessary copies of the documents for our private meetings. Therefore, we usually do not print the emails sent to us as there usually are additions to the documents brought by Jho such as copies of letters and minutes from DS Najib.

33. DS Najib himself had never instructed us to meet Jho, but he used Jho to instruct us. I know that Jho’s instructions are what DS Najib has agreed to because as I have explained, there have been several times when Datuk Azlin or I have met DS Najib to confirm the instructions received based on the documents Jho have provided us, and DS Najib at the time did not question the directive and would agree for further action to be taken.

34. The emails sent to me and Datuk Azlin by Jho are very confidential and oftentimes, they would be sent from a random email address.

I confirm that the email address Jho always used to arrange meetings and send documents to me and Datuk Azlin was [email protected]. I can confirm that this is Jho's email address because the titles or summary of the emails are similar to the matters discussed in subsequent meetings between us. Datuk

Azlin also used to refer Jho's emails to me as "dealrainman". These emails will be sent to me at [email protected] and to Datuk Azlin at [email protected]. Normally, Jho would send an email addressed to Datuk Azlin and copy it (cc) to me. After 1MDB became widely discussed by the masses, Jho would often put a password on each document attached with his emails. The passwords would be given to me and Datuk Azlin via BBM message.

35. The modus operandi for our evening meetings was when we reached the Hotel Prince KL, we would be escorted by Jho's bodyguard to the room as soon as we arrived in the lobby.
Normally, Datuk Azlin and I would go to the hotel separately. Our car registration numbers were references to the bodyguard and there were usually 1-2 Malay bodyguards who would accompany us. We will be quarantined while waiting for Jho, usually in a suite with rooms, a dining table and sofa. We typically would wait for 30 minutes to an hour. Although we met often at the Prince Hotel, the meetings were held in different rooms each time. When Jho arrived, he usually wore batik and was often in a hurry. He always arrived later than scheduled. Upon arriving at the meeting room, we would usually start with some small talk and Jho would distribute the documents to us in an orderly arrangement for discussion purposes.

36. My role then was only to arrange for meetings, then I would do my own thing like refer to my mobile phone while scanning through what I understood. This is because Jho and Datuk Azlin's discussions were quite quick. At the time, I was less familiar with issues such as finance, company structures and big names. Datuk Azlin was experienced in these things and I was rarely referred to. The meeting was quite cordial as Jho was likeable and always smiling.

37. Each time we met, Jho would tell us that he had just met DS Najib and he would inform us that we had been ordered by DS Najib to implement and assist in arranging planned follow-up actions.

We had to carry out these directives because we didn't want to disobey orders and worry about our job positions. Furthermore, Datuk Azlin was a loyalist and very obedient to DS Najib. I have never seen him defy DS Najib. This is one reason he was later selected to become the principal private secretary (Ketua Setiausaha Sulit — KSUS) to DS Najib. At that time I often received instructions from Datuk Azlin as he was my Director. The frequency of our meetings with Jho was approximately once or twice a month and they were organised by Jho through me.

38. I confirm that DS Najib has never been involved in confidential discussions between the three of us. This is because he gave Jho his mandate and authorisation, as Jho said.

Secondly, this was the way DS Najib coordinated and executed confidential work by dividing work in a closed manner (work in silo) on a need-to-know basis. Datuk Azlin and I were also told that Jho was trustworthy and was in Najib's inner-circle. That is why every time the meeting took place DS Najib did not need to be present to approve Jho's actions. In fact, Jho would often meet DS Najib first before meeting us at Prince Hotel.

39. These meetings gradually became stranger as Jho's instructions became more aggressive and excessive. Every order or action to be taken had to be carried out immediately and in a short time. Sometimes these actions were very difficult to carry out immediately but we had to do it anyway. For example, a list of individual nominees for positions listed by Jho had already existed before it was made public. It would actually need to be discussed with DS Najib first. However, it would surely have been approved by DS Najib even if the list was proposed by Jho.
 
40. During these discussions, I sometimes saw Datuk Azlin appear shocked, raising his eyebrows as if something was strange and he even questioned what was being discussed because some of these things were unusual, such as speeding up the financing approval process. However, he would respond calmly and ask us to contact DS Najib if we wanted to be sure.

41. Most of the subsequent actions taken according to Jho’s instructions would be personally carried out by Datuk Azlin himself, unless if there were instructions assigned specifically to me. Besides that, not all items in the documents discussed could be executed as per the instructions in these documents, but they would then usually be executed through other methods.

42. There were times I would accompany Datuk Azlin to smoke cigarettes without Jho around. There were a few instances during these times that Datuk Azlin would express his doubts to me. Sometimes, Datuk Azlin would counter check Jho’s instructions with DS Najib the next morning. There were numerous occasions when Datuk Azlin told me that matters discussed the night before with Jho were verified by DS Najib and had to be executed. For example, a list of names for 1MDB’s International Board of Advisor (BOA) shortlisted by Jho was approved by DS Najib when it was brought up for review by Datuk Azlin. Datuk Azlin had confirmed the incident to me later. This revealed to me that DS Najib had given Jho the authority to make plans for 1MDB.

43. In addition, Jho always told us to dispose of any documents discussed because they were confidential, and to prevent the contents of the document from being disseminated to the wrong parties. After our discussions, I would usually dispose of the documents discussed but some I overlooked and did not dispose. I think that due to the high level of confidentiality in Datuk Azlin’s work, it was possible that all the documents received by him had been disposed of. Occasionally, Datuk Azlin would give me a copy of his documents for me to keep after meeting Jho. I was able to recognise it based on Datuk Azlin's handwriting on the documents. In addition to disposing of documents, Jho also regularly reminded us either verbally, or through email and BBM message to dispose of or delete BBM messages and emails sent or provided by him.  

Terengganu Investment Authority (TIA) / 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB)

44. With regard to the proposal to establish an investment company involving the Terengganu State Government and the Government of Malaysia, which was the Terengganu Investment Authority (TIA), I confirm that I had been involved in the matter from the initial discussions. My involvement was at Jho's request and was approved by DS Najib. I am of the opinion that my involvement in TIA was because Jho was not very close with Datuk Azlin compared with me. Besides that, I also think I was chosen because I used to work in BNM and am knowledgeable in the field of economics.

45. Around the end of 2008, I received a message from Jho via BBM that said something like this: "I've got approval/blessing from DS Najib for you to join meeting for TIA". I was told to attend the meeting to discuss the proposal for the establishment of the TIA on behalf of DS Najib, who was then the PM and also the Finance Minister. I asked Najib himself and he confirmed that I was attending the meeting. I also asked for the opinion of Dato Sri Ab Aziz Kassim, who was the then Chief Secretary to DS Najib, and Datuk Azlin. They both advised me to only follow instructions given by DS Najib.

46. The meeting was held at the Terengganu Palace in Kuala Lumpur and was chaired by DYMM Tuanku Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin, who was then the King of Malaysia. This was the first time I met DYMM Tuanku Mizan. Other individuals who were also present during the meeting were Jho and Dato Aziz, the husband of YAM Tengku Rahimah Almarhum Sultan Mahmud, the sister of Tuanku Mizan. While we were waiting for the arrival of DYMM Tuanku Mizan, Jho told me that he was at that time advisor to Tuanku Mizan.

47. The meeting was just a casual one. I was introduced by Jho to the King as Special Officer to TPM. During the meeting, we only discussed informally. Jho spoke about the proposal to establish TIA. The King took note of this proposal but did not make any decision. I also noticed that he did not respond negatively to this proposal. On completion of the meeting, we left. DS Najib was not with us in this meeting.

48. I came to know about the initial idea of the TIA's establishment that involved fund raising after Jho explained it to me himself in his house located in Apartment 3 Kia Peng. Jho sketched on a white board in his kitchen. I do not remember whether this explanation occurred before or after I was asked to represent TPM in the presence of DYMM Tuanku Mizan.

49. Only Jho and I were there when he was making the explanation. At the time, I only roughly understood the concept but the methods of issuing these bonds were unclear to me as I did not have an investment banking background. I was also not well versed about fund raising and investment structures. What I understood about the concept at the time was that the TIA would create a fund via the issuance of bonds for investment abroad. These investments were expected to bring profits to the company and these profits would be given back to the people via Government policies like community service programmes. Jho also said funds for the TIA would return to the country in the form of profits.

50. Jho also told me at the time that TIA was based on the concept of the Mubadala model (Sovereign Wealth Fund), an investment company based in Abu Dhabi owned by the UAE government. At at time, Jho also said this matter (the suggestion to set up TIA) has to be implemented because it was DS Najib's directive as well a "baby" project to DS Najib through Jho's idea.

51. During the process of setting up the TIA, I attended several meetings. Among those I remember was a meeting held at the EPF Building, Petaling Jaya. I remember it was held around the end of 2008. The meeting was attended by about five people and was chaired by Tan Sri Azlan Zainol. I don't remember who was in the meeting but I can confirm that DS Najib was not there. I'm not sure if Jho was present at the meeting but I remember that I was asked to attend the meeting on Jho's instruction.

52. The issues discussed during the meeting were related to how to issue bonds and the next steps for the TIA. I also attended this meeting as a representative from the TPM Office. Given that I had only worked for a few months at the TPM's Office at the time, I listened a lot and had no objections or suggestions. However, I informed Tan Sri Azlan Zainol after the meeting ended that if there was anything needed from my part, that he should inform me. But at the time, nothing was needed from me. I also confirm that I did not take any action or report to anyone, including DS Najib, after the meeting.

53. The next TIA meeting that I remember attending concerned the Federal Government's guarantees to TIA. Despite attending the meeting, I did not take any action and only attended as a representative of the PMO. Jho Low also attended the meeting as Special Advisor to the Chairman of the TIA Advisory Panel, which was DS Najib. I do not remember who ordered me to attend this meeting but I did attend as a representative to the PM, DS Najib. The attendance list and minutes of meetings are as follows:

54. REFER TO THE ATTENDANCE LIST OF THE MEETING ON GUARANTEE TO TERENGGANU INVESTMENT AUTHORITY BHD DATED APRIL 23, 2009
[Exhibit _______]
[Volume 26 Tab 1]
This is a document of the attendance list for the Meeting on Guarantee for Terengganu Investment Authority Bhd held on April 23, 2009 (Thursday) at 6.30pm at the KSP Meeting Room, 10th Floor, Middle Block. The meeting was chaired by the Secretary General of the Treasury (KSP), who was at that time YBhg Tan Sri Dr Wan Abdul Aziz Wan Abdullah. Referring to this document, those present at this meeting included:

i. Myself
ii. Dato Aziz, representing TIA
iii. Jho Low, representing TIA
iv. Shahrol Halmi, representing TIA
v. Tan Sri Rozali, representing TIA
vi. PCP which is short for Treasury Solicitor; and
vii. SBK (Setiausaha Bahagian BPKA)

55. Referring to this list of names, I certify that all the named persons were present at the meeting chaired by the KSP based on the written and signed records issued herein, including Jho. I confirm that the signature at the space for my name was my signature and that I wrote it myself. However, I am unable to confirm the actual attendance count as this attendance list was not filled completely and was not prepared by me.

56. REFER TO THE MINUTES OF MEETING, MEETING ABOUT TERENGANU INVESTMENT AUTHORITY BHD DATED APRIL 23, 2009 IN THE MAIN MEETING ROOM, LEVEL 10, MIDDLE BLOCK, TREASURY OF MALAYSIA AND THE WORKING PAPER OF THE TERENGANU INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, BRIEFING TO MOF
[Exhibit________]
[Volume 1 Tab 28]

This is the Minutes of the Meeting about Terengganu Investment Authority held on April 23, 2009. Referring to this document, those in attendance include:

i. Tan Sri Dr Wan Abdul Aziz Bin Wan Abdullah – KSP
ii. Tan Sri Rozali bin Ismail
iii. Dato' Abd Aziz Mohd Akhir, TIA
iv. En Shahrul Azral bin Ibrahim Halmi – CEO, TIA
v. En. Low Taek Jho – Special Advisor to the Chairman of the TIA Advisory Panel (BOA)
vi. Datuk Siti Zainab – Finance Legal Officer, BUU
vii. Datuk Nozirah Bahari – Division Secretary, BPKA
viii. En Maliami Hamad – Deputy Division Secretary, BPKA
ix. En Razali Othman – Chief Assistant Secretary KK(M)2, BPKA

57. I don't know why my name wasn't included in the attendance list as I didn’t prepare this document. However, based on the documents I referred to earlier and my own memory, I was present at this meeting. The issues discussed during this meeting were as per sheet 2 and 3 of this document. As I recall, I was rather quiet as I had less experience involving these formal meetings.

58. Another TIA meeting that I remember attending was around May 2009, and was held in the Parliament House meeting room. I was suddenly asked to attend the meeting by Dato Sri Ab Aziz Kassim, the KSUS to DS Najib at the time. The meeting was also attended by several representatives from the Terengganu State Government, including their Exco.

59. By the time I got to the meeting room, the meeting had already started. The conclusion that I could draw from the meeting was that the Terengganu State Government was dissatisfied with the structure of the TIA as there was no representative from the Terengganu State Government to represent their interest in making any decision in the TIA. In addition, the role of Chief Minister Incorporated (MBI) was not active on the board of directors. Following this meeting, I informed Dato Sri Ab Aziz Kassim of the matters discussed, which he took note of and waited for further instructions from DS Najib.

60. Jho and Datuk Azlin once told me that the establishment of the TIA was an idea brought up by Jho and agreed to by DS Najib. This was further reinforced by my presence at the Terengganu palace before the King, which would not have happened without the approval of and blessing from DS Najib. DS Najib wanted to make this TIA a "special vehicle company for strategic investment overseas". Jho acted as the consultant and managing coordinator, and the Board of Directors (BOD) in the TIA was appointed with the knowledge and approval of DS Najib.

61. There were a few occasions that Jho sent emails and met up with Datuk Azlin and I to discuss frequently asked questions that the PMO had to answer if 1MDB issues were questioned by any party. Besides that, there were also meetings where Jho had data or information prepared and asked Datuk Azlin and I to be aware of the relevant issues arising like 1MDB issues so that we were always prepared in case somebody questioned us, or if there were collaborations involving these issues.

62. Documents about my early involvement in the setting up of TIA clearly show that Jho had ensured I was appointed as the TIA Secretariat in the early days of its establishment and he asked me to take part in a meeting on April 23, 2009, which he also attended. In truth, our attendance was to represent the Prime Minister, who was DS Najib at that time. The objective of the meeting was to obtain early funding via fund raising by the Federal Government. Jho Low was also present as coordinator on TIA's behalf to confirm the agenda for TIA.

1MDB's joint venture with Petrosaudi and Aabar

63. On the cooperation with Petrosaudi and Aabar (Middle Eastern companies), my involvement and knowledge in the issue of Petrosaudi and Aabar throughout the tenure of my service with Datuk Azlin during his lifetime was limited. Datuk Azlin was the officer in charge of handling 1MDB at the PMO and the Ministry of Finance. This was because he was experienced in investment banking and had good relationships with and knew many important individuals in the financial industry.

64. This was why Jho asked me to arrange a meeting between him and Datuk Azlin to discuss issues involving 1MDB, including Petrosaudi and Aabar. I arranged this meeting using the same modus operandi of the secret meetings that I explained before this. Normally, Jho would ask me to schedule the appointment via BBM (BlackBerry Messenger) to meet and discuss with Datuk Azlin. Sometimes, Jho would send emails first to me to print the documents attached, although during each meet up Jho himself would bring copies of the issues to be discussed for the two of us. Some copies of these documents he took back, some he didn't, on conclusion of the discussions.

65. Discussions with Datuk Azlin were usually about important matters (milestones) like big decisions that needed the PMO's involvement, appointment of individuals, drafting answers for FAQs on issues that became 1MDB's problems, the latest updates on matters that arose, and the current progress involving 1MDB for our knowledge. Usually, Jho would discuss directly with Datuk Azlin on these documents and my role was only to arrange the meeting.

66. During their discussions, I focused less on the details of the discussions because most of the time I was just playing with my handphone. My role usually was only to accompany Datuk Azlin. The action structure or key implementation instructions involving Petrosaudi and Aabar were arranged by Jho and DS Najib but we were not involved during their discussions. We knew that it had been discussed with DS Najib because Jho himself informed us that the matter had been authorised by DS Najib.

67. The distribution of duties that needed to be done depended on the relevant officers who had to do them. I would like to explain that on 1MDB's daily and operational issues which involve Petrosaudi and Aabar, that would be between Jho and the individual who took care of the said portfolio. For example, if a 1MDB daily issue arose, Jho would directly contact the 1MDB CEO, while Datuk Azlin would be given tasks related to his role as the director in PMO. I never had discussions with those individuals. I know Jho had discussions with them because Jho was the one who said he would talk to them. On this Petrosaudi and Aabar issue, Jho had a lot of direct contact with those involved at various management levels so that what had been agreed on by DS Najib could be implemented.

68. As Datuk Azlin's influence was wide enough and he was also my boss, many of the follow-up work documents were handled by Datuk Azlin when he was the Economics Division Director and the PM's chief private secretary. Most of those documents didn't go through me or I only forwarded, sent and received documents.

69. Throughout my experience with Jho, I found that he was clever in manipulations when dealing with officers of various levels and ranks whether in Malaysia or overseas, most of whom DS Najib knew of. Hence, only Jho and DS Najib will know of the most complete picture about the machinations they arranged. Jho was a "master manipulator" and in this situation, I can say now that I have been used for a dishonest purpose. Datuk Azlin and I only knew of many of the things that happened after the 1MDB issue was reported as an embezzlement issue within and outside the country because we worked in silo as our work was divided.

70. The issue of 1MDB's embezzlement by Jho Low started to be aggressively discussed towards the end of 2014 until early 2015. At the time, it had been widely reported in local and overseas media, among which were Sarawak Report, Wall Street Journal (WSJ), New York Times and Malaysian Insider. This 1MDB embezzlement issue was raised more often as time passed and each time Jho would prepare answers or direct Datuk Azlin to do damage control or follow up to contain the 1MDB issue.

71. I confirm that my role in the Petrosaudi issue is limited to the follow-up actions or communication plan where I only acted as the middleman to facilitate meetings between Datuk Azlin and Jho Low. This was especially when the Petrosaudi issue blew up in the mass media. When Datuk Azlin and Jho Low met for dicussions, I would also attend. Some of the issues that were discussed involved investments with Petrosaudi but if there were follow-up actions, they were taken by Datuk Azlin while I was not involved.

72. My direct involvement in the Aabar joint venture was to help facilitate so that the Governments of Malaysia and UAE would not bring the IPIC settlement issue to the International Court.

73. On the 1MDB embezzlement issues that were raging throughout the mass media like I mentioned above, they started to spread at the end of 2014 via a few articles started by domestic news portals like Sarawak Report and Malaysian Insider. These portals exposed Jho Low's luxurious life and his expensive and exraordinary spending and purchases, said to be using funds from 1MDB's investments. At the time, this issue started to become the topic of conversation in Malaysia and had an effect on and pressured the whole of PMO because it involved the reputation and image of DS Najib. This was because DS Najib was said to have a close relationship with Jho in various fields, including 1MDB. This matter did not become too big of an issue for Datuk Azlin at that time because the media reports mentioned were still just focusing on Jho Low and his luxurious lifestyle and not directly targeting DS Najib.

74. However, in early 2015, these exposés started to become an issue that had to be dealt with by the PMO (red flag) especially through Datuk Azlin. This was because it had started to spread on the media that the 1MDB issue involved DS Najib. Datuk Azlin was involved in ensuring the issue was dealt with because he was most skilled and knew a lot about 1MDB. This issue started to be triggered at around January and February 2015 as exposés, with supporting evidence attached — like pictures, emailed documents, bank transactions and transfers of money — about the embezzlement of 1MDB funds via the Petrosaudi-1MDB joint venture that was said to have been transferred to the private account of Jho Low, began to spread.

75. Besides that, the biggest issue which caused a negative impact to DS Najib at that time involved the purchase of real estate and the financing of Hollywood movies by DS Najib's stepson, Riza Aziz, using 1MDB funds. At the time, the name of Riza Aziz's film production company was not known but it was later exposed as Red Granite Pictures. The media that played up the issue together with evidence were well-known overseas media, namely New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and domestic news portals like Sarawak Report and Malaysian Insider. There was evidence then that exposed Riza Aziz had bought luxury properties in the US and financed the movie Wolf of Wall Street by Red Granite using what was said to be 1MDB funds. The media portal Sarawak Report at the time revealed that Riza Aziz got the money from 1MDB funds. This at once had a direct effect on DS Najib because Riza Aziz is his stepson.

76. As a result of these exposés, the issue involving 1MDB started to heat up in Malaysia and caused an uproar in PMO. The issues that were revealed were so shocking to everybody, including to me and Datuk Azlin. All this while, we (Datuk Azlin and I) had been directed by Jho Low via talking points that were given by him involving this matter to inform everyone at PMO that all these were manipulations by the Opposition and by those who wanted to see the downfall of DS Najib. Documents, including talking points which Jho sent to us in the usual way at the time, were aimed at answering these reports and the accusations that had spread.

77. During that period, Datuk Azlin informed me in our daily conversation that the 1MDB problem was spreading and a lot of attacks on DS Najib were happening as a result of the media exposés. He didn't share with me the problems in detail and only informed me about them in general. This showed that he had already started to take note that the 1MDB issue involved DS Najib. He had to do so because it was part of his task as Najib's KSUS.

78. It was during this time, in January or February 2015 (I cannot recall the exact date), that an incident that I remember well took place following the spread of the 1MDB issue. On that day, I just came into the office in PMO and was waiting for Datuk Azlin in his office as he was in a meeting with DS Najib on the fifth floor. On his return to his office, I saw he looked very pressured and he released that pressure by raising his voice and saying "Duit 1MDB lah Bro!" to me, as he threw the files in his hands onto the table. I remember the situation particularly well because as long as I have known him, Datuk Azlin was someone who was always calm, polite and had never acted that way in front of me. He was not someone who liked to raise his voice.

79. At that moment, I believed Datuk Azlin's reaction was due to the media exposés regarding 1MDB like the Petrosaudi joint venture, Jho Low's spending using 1MDB funds, the purchase of luxury properties by Riza Aziz, the source of funds for the movies by Riza Aziz, and the transfer of 1MDB funds to suspicious accounts. In addition, our office was usually in an uproar when there were exposés from the media involving the misuse of 1MDB funds. These were the issues that were most hotly talked about at the time. I can appreciate the pressure that he faced as he was the one who knew the most about 1MDB. He was the individual who handled this issue on Jho Low's instuctions and as far as I know, he was also responsible in referring these issues to DS Najib. Because he was so pressured, I left his office so as not to disturb him.

80. Recently, I read an article that was published by local paper The Edge on Sept 23, 2018 that mentioned Datuk Azlin had assisted in the opening of DS Najib's private account in Ambank Islamic on Jan 13, 2011 by instructing Nik Faisal Ariff Kamil, who was the SRC International CEO at the time, to handle the account on behalf of DS Najib. Datuk Azlin was also said to be the one who had arranged for the meeting between Ambank and DS Najib at DS Najib's house in Jalan Langgak Duta. The article also reported that it was into this account that a big sum, amounting US$680 million or publicly known as RM2.6 billion from 1MDB, had gone.

81. After reading the article, I was shocked because I had no knowledge whether Datuk Azlin was involved in this matter and to me, the article didn't give the whole picture of what happened. As far as I know and have mentioned before this, throughout the time I knew and worked with Datuk Azlin, he was someone who was very loyal and obedient to the leader's instruction, what more when his own boss was the Prime Minister of Malaysia himself. To my knowledge, he had never disobeyed DS Najib's instructions and he would always try to ensure that all of DS Najib's instructions were implemented. As a special officer and KSUS to DS NAjib, it was his duty to facilitate and follow instructions that were given as well as to refer to DS Najib for confirmation if there were anything he couldn't understand or had doubts about.

82. Each secret meeting or informal meeting that took place in DS Najib's house on Jalan Langgak Duta needed approval from DS Najib himself because it involved the time, schedule and access to DS Najib's private residence. It was impossible and illogical for him (Datuk Azlin) to arrange the meeting between DS Najib and Ambank in DS Najib's private residence on his own initiative without first getting DS Najib's agreement. Furthermore, it was also illogical to say that Datuk Azlin himself had wanted to arrange and make the decisions in relation to the control over and arrangement for DS Najib's account without instruction or approval from the higher-ups, like Jho Low or DS Najib himself. Throughout the more or less seven years I worked under Datuk Azlin and was trained on his modus operandi as I have mentioned before this, I believe Datuk Azlin had and did refer the matter to DS Najib to get his agreement.

83. Referring to the entry of a big amount into DS Najib’s account, as reported in the article, now only I understand what Datuk Azlin meant when he cried out “Duit 1MDB lah Bro!” in anger to me previously, which is highly likely he was referring to the entry of of US$680 million or RM2.6 billion into the personal account of DS Najib, as was reported, and not just limited to the issue that involved his stepson, Riza Aziz.

84. Datuk Azlin never shared any stories or information about this account with me. This was because Datuk Azli was a secretive person when undertaking confidential tasks and big secrets under the instruction of DS Najib.

85. Although I was not deeply involved regarding the follow-up damage control actions that came after the issue caused an uproar, I can nevertheless say that many counter measures or damage control that were done came from Jho Low via the documents he gave. Among these documents include a few letters that were referred to me, like one from the Saudi Arabia Ambassador and Embassy of Malaysia in Saudi Arabia to tackle the media exposé issue at the time. These letters were also attached with talking points that were prepared by Jho Low for media management by PMO, which was at the time handled by Paul Stadlen, to prepare a communications plan. Besides that, Jho Low also prepared notes, steps that needed to be taken and a checklist of agencies that needed to be engaged to close the investigation into the issue, including SPRM (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission), PDRM (The Royal Malaysian Police) and others. These documents were given to Datuk Azlin and I because we were the ones from PMO who could refer to and coordinate with DS Najib.

86. Throughout the time Datuk Azlin served as the Economics Division director in PMO and the PM’s KSUS, all matters pertaining to 1MDB was handled by himself. I was only indirectly involved when I joined the discussions about the 1MDB issue that involved me, Jho and Datuk Azlin. Before he passed away, I was only involved in some issues or when instructed by DS Najib to undertake ad-hoc duties because I was not given the full power to replace Datuk Azlin in his duties regarding 1MDB. Datuk Azlin passed away on April 4, 2015, not long after the 1MDB fund embezzlement issues spread in the mass media, as I mentioned above.

87. In reference to the official letter from International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) dated Nov 6, 2012, as I remember, I received the letter from Datuk Azlin. The official IPIC letter was addressed to DS Najib as Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and chairman of 1MDB’s advisory board. When I received the letter from Datuk Azlin, the letter indeed already had notations from and signed by DS Najib.

88. However, I don’t have detailed knowledge about the content of the letter and information about this collaboration because it was under the silo scope of Datuk Azlin. All matters involving 1MDB going through PMO at the time was under the knowledge of Datuk Azlin alone. I only helped out once in a while and sometimes was involved to carry out Datuk Azlin’s instruction. Datuk Azlin had requested my assistance to forward a letter to the 1MDB chairman who was also the chairman and managing director of Boustead Holdings Tan Sri Lodin bin Wok Kamaruddin for further actions, as was instructed by DS Najib and in accordance to his notes.

89. I instructed my assistant to prepare the cover letter and I signed it myself, as was instructed by Datuk Azlin. I didn’t follow up on the letter because Datuk Azlin only asked me to forward the letter to the 1MDB chairman. I confirm that I have no knowledge regarding the discussion between IPIC and 1MDB. To my knowledge, normally letters like IPIC’s most likely came in one of three ways, the first of which would be that it was sent straight to the PMO, second, it was brought by Datuk Azlin himself for DS Najib’s approval, or third, it could be handed over by DS Najib to Datuk Azlin, possibly from the Ministry of Finance.

90. REFER TO LETTER FROM PMO ADDRESSED TO TAN SRI DATO CHE LODIN WOK KAMARUDDIN, DATED NOV 23, 2012, TITLED ‘HIS EXCELLENCY DATO SRI MOHD NAJIB BIN TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE MALAYSIA, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF ADVISORS 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BHD’ FROM AMHARI EFENDI BIN NAZARUDDIN
[EXHIBIT_______]
[VOLUME 8 TAB 6]

This document was the letter that was sent out by PMO to 1MDB’s chairman, who was Tan Sri Che Lodin Wok Kamaruddin, titled ‘His Excellency Dato Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Malaysia, Chairman, Board of Advisors, 1Malaysia Development Bhd’ from me. In this letter, it was stated that the letter was forwarded with several documents that were self-explanatory for the attention and further actions by the 1MDB chairman, which was Tan Sri Dato’ Che Lodin Wok Kamaruddin. I confirm the letter was signed by myself as special officer to Prime Minister DS Najib. With this letter was attached a two-page letter from IPIC dated Nov 6, 2012. This IPIC letter that was given to me by Datuk Azlin had a note from DS Najib that said, “Y.Bhg Tan Sri Lodin, I agree with the proposal [in] paragraph 2. Pls handle this matter”. Under this note was DS Najib’s signature. I can recognize the signature because as the special officer I am used to seeing his signature.

91. This letter is standard procedure whereby whenever a document is minuted or signed by DS Najib in his capacity as Finance Minister, this document will be forwarded to the relevant person. In this case, I was ordered by Datuk Azlin to forward the letter to the chairman of 1MDB at the time, who was Tan Sri Che Lodin for further action. I do not know how DS Najib obtained and signed the letter because my task was only to forward the letter to the chairman of 1MDB, Tan Sri Che Lodin.

92. There are several confidential action plans and talking points documents by Jho Low that are still in my keeping, including those involving Petrosaudi and Aabar, which are the two companies in which Jho Low had an interest in and involved a joint venture with 1MDB. Although Jho had asked me to destroy them due to concerns that they may be leaked, they are still in my keeping. Among the damage control documents relating to the 1MDB–Petrosaudi issue that were given by Jho Low and still in my keeping are as follows:

93. REFER TO DOCUMENT [TO DESTROY/SHRED DOCUMENT AFTER READING: SENSITIVE] PLEASE KINDLY FIND ATTACHED WITH APPENDIX:

i. LETTER FROM THE ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA KUALA LUMPUR TO Y.A.B. DATO SRI MOHD NAJIB BIN TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK WITH REFERENCE NUMBER: SA/089/11 DATED 10 MAY 2011 ENTITLED RE: LETTER OF SUPPORT RE PETROSAUDI INTERNATIONAL

ii. LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR OF MALAYSIA KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD WITH REFERENCE NUMBER AMB/1MDB/01/2011 DATED 7 MAY 2011 ENTITLED RE: LETTER OF CONFIRMATION RE PETROSAUDI INTERNATIONAL (PSI)

iii. LETTER FROM REGIONAL MANAGEMENT COMMERCIAL BANKING DIVISION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION DEPT CENTRAL REGION TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD DATED 1 MAY 2011 ENTITLED REFERENCE LETTER FOR MR. TAREK ESSAM OBAID IN SAUDI ARABIA

iv. LETTER FROM HELVETICA WEALTH MANAGEMENT PARTNERS AG TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD DATED 1 OCTOBER 2010 ENTITLED LETTER OF REFERENCE AND CONFIRMATION FOR PETROSAUDI INTERNATIONAL LTD (PSI), A COMPANY INCORPORATED IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (KSA)

v. LETTER FROM J.P. MORGAN (SUISSE) SA TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD DATED 3 MAY 2011
[EXHIBIT________]
[VOLUME 26 TAB 2]

These documents were the talking points and checklist appended with five letters that were prepared by Jho Low. These documents were given by Jho Low to Datuk Azlin and myself between the end of 2014 and early 2015. Jho Low had prepared the damage control steps related to the 1MDB issue that were published widely by the media, including New York Times, WSJ and Sarawak Report at the time.

94. Referring to item 5 on the front page of the talking points, it is clear that Jho Low wanted all five of the letters to be used as responses and guarantees to close cases if there were to be an investigation by the authorities against Petrosaudi. As I remember, a “Special Task Force” was set up comprising the Attorney-General, the IGP, the Chief Commissioner of MACC and the Governor of Bank Negara, which was tasked with investigating the issues surrounding 1MDB. That may be the reason why Jho had, in item 5, refered to these four individuals.

95. I am sure that these documents came up when Datuk Azlin was still alive as these documents were given by Jho to us around end-2014 to early 2015. These documents relate to the explanation that Petrosaudi had fulfilled all of its commitments and that there was no need for further investigations. Several supporting letters were also appended with the reasoning behind why the documents were prepared, as well as the background of the joint venture between Petrosaudi and 1MDB. It also describes the positive returns to the country from Saudi Arabia as a result of the agreement between 1MDB and Petrosaudi. This document has been in my keeping after the meeting among the three of us, namely myself, Datuk Azlin and Jho Low at Prince Hotel, which was where we usually met to discuss these issues.

96. The reason why these documents were given to me and Datuk Azlin was to ensure that we were always in the know about current developments, to enable us to always be ready and know how to explain the issues that were brought up by the public. Jho asked us to get rid of the documents to avoid leakage but I did not destroy them. I did not take any further action after receiving these documents but I do not know whether Datuk Azlin had taken any further action.

97. The first appendix of the document is the LETTER FROM THE ROYAL EMBASSY OF SAUDI ARABIA KUALA LUMPUR TO Y.A.B. DATO SRI MOHD NAJIB BIN TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK WITH REFERENCE NUMBER:SA/089/1, DATED 10 MAY 2011 ENTITLED RE: LETTER OF SUPPORT RE PETROSAUDI INTERNATIONAL. This letter was given by Jho Low together with the talking points on the front page. This letter was to show that the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Kuala Lumpur had affirmed their support for Petrosaudi International.

98. The second appendix of the document is the LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR OF MALAYSIA KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD WITH REFERENCE NUMBER AMB/1MDB/01/2011 DATED 7 MAY 2011 ENTITLED RE: LETTER OF CONFIRMATION RE PETROSAUDI INTERNATIONAL (PSI). This letter was given by Jho Low together with the talking points on the front page. This letter was to show that the Ambassador of Malaysia in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had affirmed his support for Petrosaudi International.

99. The third appendix of the document is the LETTER FROM THE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT COMMERCIAL BANKING DIVISION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION DEPT CENTRAL REGION TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BHD DATED 1 MAY 2011 ENTITLED REFERENCE LETTER FOR MR. TAREK ESSAM OBAID IN SAUDI ARABIA. This letter was given by Jho Low together with the talking points on the front page. This letter was to show that the Saudi Arabia Bank had affirmed support for the owner of Petrosaudi International.

100. The fourth appendix of this document is the LETTER FROM HELVETICA WEALTH MANAGEMENT PARTNERS AG TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD DATED 1 OCTOBER 2010 ENTITLED LETTER OF REFERENCE AND CONFIRMATION FOR PETROSAUDI INTERNATIONAL LTD (PSI), A COMPANY INCORPORATED IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA (KSA). This letter was given by Jho Low together with the talking points on the front page. I confirm that this letter was to show that Helvetica had affirmed support for the owner of Petrosaudi International.

101. The fifth appendix of this document is the LETTER FROM J.P. MORGAN (SUISSE) SA TO 1MALAYSIA DEVELOPMENT BERHAD DATED 3 MAY 2011. This letter was given by Jho Low together with the talking points on the front page. This letter was to show that J.P. Morgan Suisse had affirmed its support for the owner of Petrosaudi International.

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