GENERATION Z is no longer a demographic footnote. In many democracies including Malaysia, it is now an electoral reality. The question is not whether Gen Z matters, but what its rise means for the character and stability of democratic politics.

A growing body of scholarship represented by books authored dealing with the issue, from "The Politics of Gen Z: How the Youngest Voters Will Shape Our Democracy" by Melissa Deckman, "Gen-Z in World Politics" by Nutun Karigor, "Voices of Gen Z: Shaping Transitions in the City of Peace and Justice" by Rosa Groen and Tahir Abbas, "Gen Z Around the World: Understanding the Global Cohort Culture of Generation Z" by Corey Seemiller and Meghan Grace, as well as the updated edition of "Fight: How Gen Z Is Channeling Their Fear and Passion to Save America" by John Della Volpe suggests that we are witnessing more than generational succession. We are witnessing a moral recasting of democratic expectations.

Yet we must resist romanticism. Gen Z carries democratic promise, but also democratic risk.

Having worked as an academic, served in Cabinet, and contested elections in the age of social media, I am persuaded that both realities coexist.

The thesis of youth apathy no longer holds. Empirical work by Deckman and Della Volpe shows that Gen Z is politically engaged, particularly young women who demonstrate higher levels of mobilisation and electoral consistency. This engagement is not ornamental; it is forged in crisis such as climate instability, economic insecurity, pandemic disruption and institutional distrust.

Della Volpe describes this as “existential anxiety”. However, I would call it rather a “moral impatience”.

In my years as education minister, I encountered this impatience repeatedly. Students were not disengaged. They were sceptical of platitudes and impatient with inconsistency. They demanded coherence between rhetoric and action.

This was evident in the 2022 Malaysian general election. For the first time, millions of newly enfranchised young voters participated under the Undi18 framework. Many were not moved by traditional patronage politics. They were responsive to narratives of integrity, governance reform and economic justice.

However, it would be naïve to conclude that issue-based rationality alone shaped their choices.

The same digital immediacy that fuels moral engagement also makes Gen Z vulnerable to political simplification.

The 2022 election demonstrated something more sobering. Identity-based narratives, particularly those amplified through short, emotionally charged social media messaging proved highly effective among segments of young voters.

Perikatan Nasional capitalised on concise, high-impact messaging centred on religious identity, moral anxiety and anti-establishment sentiment. These messages travelled efficiently through TikTok, Telegram and other platforms where nuance struggles to survive.

The success of this strategy should not be dismissed as accidental. Digital ecosystems reward clarity over complexity, emotion over deliberation. A fifteen-second video can eclipse a fifty-page policy document.

Yet electoral enthusiasm does not always translate into sustained conviction. In the months following the election, many young voters expressed disappointment, particularly when parliamentary debates were perceived as lacking intellectual rigour or policy depth, including performances by some members of Parliament from Malaysian Islamic Party within the opposition bloc.

This disillusionment is instructive. It reveals that while identity politics may mobilise swiftly, its durability depends on governance quality and substantive performance.

But such post-electoral regret should not induce complacency. Emotional mobilisation can recur if structural literacy remains weak.

Nutun Karigor characterises Gen Z politics as digital, discontented and disruptive. That framework applies readily to Malaysia.

Digital nativity allows Gen Z to organise rapidly and challenge authority effectively. But digital immersion also fragments attention spans and compresses complex political questions into binary frames.

The danger is not merely misinformation; it is reductionism. When political discourse is mediated primarily through short-form content, cognitive shortcuts replace analytical evaluation.

In such an environment, identity-based appeals, ie. religious, ethnic or ideological can overshadow economic data, fiscal constraints or institutional reform proposals.

The responsibility, therefore, lies not only with political actors who exploit such dynamics, but with governments and educational institutions that must strengthen civic reasoning.

If Gen Z is to become a stabilising force rather than a destabilising one, civic education must be treated as democratic infrastructure.

Critical thinking cannot remain a slogan in curriculum documents. It must be operationalised in classrooms, universities and digital literacy programmes. Students must be trained not only to consume information, but to interrogate it.

In retrospect, Undi18 was structurally transformative. But enfranchisement without intellectual preparation creates asymmetry. Political rights must be accompanied by political literacy.

Government must therefore invest rigorously in civic education, and not partisan indoctrination, but analytical capacity. Young voters must be equipped to distinguish policy from propaganda, evidence from emotional manipulation.

Emotions are intrinsic to politics. But they must be disciplined by reason.

Realistically according to the literature, one theme recurs: Gen Z demands authenticity. It is intolerant of hypocrisy and swift in digital judgement.

This moral insistence can renew democratic integrity. But if authenticity morphs into absolutism, compromise becomes betrayal. Democracies cannot function without negotiated coexistence.

The lesson of 2022 is therefore double-edged. Gen Z can energise democratic participation. But it can also be mobilised through emotionally condensed narratives that bypass deliberation.

As we look toward the next general election, it is clear that Gen Z will not merely participate; it will shape outcomes. Its electoral behaviour will likely hinge on three variables: perceived integrity of leadership, economic credibility and narrative resonance in digital spaces.

Political parties that rely solely on personality or patronage will struggle. But those that master emotional messaging without substantive policy depth may win temporarily, but lose legitimacy quickly.

Gen Z does not seek the abandonment of democracy. It seeks its purification. The danger is not that it cares too much, but that its emotional accelerants can be harnessed by actors who privilege symbolism over substance.

Democratic stability in Malaysia will depend on whether institutions can respond with seriousness such as strengthening governance quality while elevating civic reasoning.

If we treat young voters merely as instruments of mobilisation, they will remain vulnerable to manipulation.

Nevertheless, if we treat them as adult intellectual citizens, capable of disciplined judgement, they may yet become the generation that stabilises and matures our democracy.

The task before us is therefore not to dampen their moral energy, but to cultivate their critical faculties.

Democracy cannot survive on emotion alone. Nor can it survive without it.

It must learn, once again, to balance both.

Dr Maszlee Malik is chairman of the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia and a former minister of education.